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RESPONSE TO CROSS APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
I. THE TRIAL COURT APPLIED THE CORRECT LAW IN 
DENYING THE RESPONDENT'S REQUEST FOR 
ATTORNEY'S FEES 
In his Cross Appellant's Brief, the Respondent alleges that the trial court 
erred in denying his request for attorney's fees made under Utah Code Ann. § 77-
3a-101(16), which states, "After a hearing with notice to the affected party, the 
court may enter an order requiring any party to pay the costs of the action, 
including reasonable attorney's fees." The Respondent alleges that the trial court 
erred in analyzing his request for attorney's fees using the three-pronged test set 
forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 as interpreted in Chipman v. Miller, 934 P.2d 
1158 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). The Court found that attorney fees were proper if (1) 
the party seeking fees prevailed, (2) the claim or defense asserted by the opposing 
party was meritless, and (3) that claim or defense was asserted in bad faith. Id. at 
1161. 
In A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing and Heating v. Guv. 94 P.3d 270 (Utah 
2004), the Utah Supreme Court states, "when reviewing attorney fee decisions that 
involve questions of law, we review for correctness .. . This is also the standard 
we apply when construing statutes." IcL at 272. The question of whether the Judge 
correctly concluded that § 78-27-56 supplements § 77-3&-101(16) is a question of 
law to be reviewed for correctness. 
The question of whether § 78-27-56 applies to supplement § 77-3a-101(16) 
is a question of first impression in Utah. The trial court Judge stated, "The court is 
persuaded that Section 78-27-56 governs the awarding of an attorney fee in actions 
involving a civil stalking injunction." (Ruling on Verified Application for Atty's 
Fees and Costs at 2). 
It is reasonable that with such a broad grant of discretion in whether to 
grant attorney's fees, the trial court would seek to make the decision based on 
sound judicial principles. In fact, the trial court is required to set forth the grounds 
on which it made its decision: "To permit meaningful review of the trial court's 
discretionary ruling, '[w]e have consistently encouraged trial courts to make 
findings to explain the factors which they considered relevant in arriving at an 
attorney fee award . . . " Bell v. Bell 810 P.2d 474, 478 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Failure by the trial court to be sufficiently detailed in its legal conclusions and 
findings of fact leads to remand by the appellate courts. Shinkoskey v. 
Shinkoskev, 19 P.3d 1005, 1010 (Utah Ct. App. 2001). 
The U.S. Supreme Court reiterated the importance of this: "A motion to a 
court's "discretion" is a motion, not to its inclination or whim, but to its judgment; 
and its judgment is to be guided by sound legal principles." Martin v. Franklin 
Capital Corp., 2005 WL 3299410 (U.S.) at 5. The Supreme Court has specifically 
addressed motions for attorney's fees by stating, "When applying fee-shifting 
statutes, 'we have found limits in 'the large objectives' of the relevant Act, which 
embrace certain 'equitable considerations.'" Id 
In Fogertv v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994), the United States Supreme 
Court, in a case involving a fee-shifting statute almost identical to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-3a-101(16), stated that Section 505 of the Copyright Protection Act provides 
that, "the court may . . . award a reasonable attorney's fee to the prevailing party 
as part of the costs." Id at 517. 
The Court suggested that in determining whether to award attorney's fees 
under a fee-shifting statute, " . . . equitable discretion should be exercised 'in light 
of considerations we have identified.'" Id. at 534. The Court further elaborated on 
these "equitable considerations" in Footnote 19: 
Some courts following the evenhanded standard have suggested 
several nonexclusive factors to guide courts' discretion. For 
example, the Third Circuit has listed several nonexclusive factors 
that courts should consider in making awards of attorney's fees to 
any prevailing party. These factors include, 'frivolousness, 
motivations, objective unreasonableness (both in the factual and the 
legal components of the case), and the need in particular 
circumstances to advance considerations of compensation and 
deterrence. We agree that such factors may be used to guide courts' 
discretion, so long as such factors are faithful to the purposes of the 
Copyright Act and are applied to prevailing plaintiffs and defendants 
in an evenhanded manner. Id. 
In that the Chipman factors used by the trial court to guide its decision-
making closely match the factors the Supreme Court listed in Fogerty, they are 
appropriate equitable guides. 
Furthermore, the Chipman factors, as expostulated in Utah Code Ann. §78-
27-56 embody the desires of the Utah State Legislature in awarding attorney's fees 
in civil actions. Because the stalking injunction in the case at bar is a civil action, 
it is appropriate to look to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 to determine what factors 
the Utah State Legislature considered important in determining whether attorney 
fees should be shifted to an opposing party in a civil case. 
The Respondent suggests that Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-3a-101(16) and 78-
27-56 somehow conflict and that the application of § 77-3a-101(16) precludes 
analysis under § 78-27-56. It is submitted that the statutes are not in conflict. 
Section 77-3a-101(16) gives the court authorization to award attorney's fees in its 
discretion, and § 78-27-56 provides some equitable guides for attorney fees in 
civil cases. 
It is clearly appropriate to apply the principles of § 78-27-56 to this case 
because it involves a petition for court protection by a victim of an alleged sexual 
assault and subsequent stalking. Sound public policy dictates these victims not be 
afraid to petition the court for help. It would be a very serious and dangerous 
precedent for a trial court to begin shifting the burden of paying attorney's fees to 
a victim of stalking who did not prevail in the trial court. It is appropriate for the 
trial court to require a Respondent who wants the trial court to shift his or her 
defense fees to the Petitioner to first prove that the Petitioner's stalking case is 
without merit and was not pursued in good faith. If the trial court were to shift fees 
upon any lesser showing of bad faith, it would have a serious chilling effect on the 
willingness of stalking victims to seek the protection of the courts. Many victims 
might expose themselves to the danger of further stalking or assault rather than 
face the prospect of being ordered to pay costly attorney fees if they fail to prevail. 
For the above reasons, ti ic : . ;a i * * -^16) 
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was harmless error where the evidence was t *c.i 
capable of supporting a finding in favor of the judgment." Kinkella v. Baugh, 660 
P.2d 233 (Utah 1983). Utah appellate courts often apply the "harmless error" 
doctrine to deny remand for mistakes that do not affect the outcome of a case. In 
Liskav. Liska, 902 P.2d 644 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), this Court stated the following: 
The commissioner erred by failing to make a record of her 
communication with the Colorado magistrate regarding the 
assumption of jurisdiction by the Colorado court. However, such 
error was harmless because the commissioner's recommendation to 
decline to exercise Utah's continuing jurisdiction over this case, and 
the trial court's decision based thereon, were inarguably correct. 
Accordingly, we affirm. Id. at 650. 
Similarly, in this case, it is clear that regardless of how it reached its 
conclusion, the trial court was correct not to require the Petitioner to pay the 
Respondent's attorney's fees. The trial court made explicit findings supporting its 
conclusion: 
Specifically, the claim brought by the petitioner had serious merit 
and was brought in good faith. The court previously found that the 
petitioner had been the victim of a vicious sexual assault committed 
by the respondent resulting in the petitioner experiencing anxiety 
and panic when she was around the respondent subsequent to the 
assault It was therefore reasonable that the petitioner would seek to 
limit the respondent's ability to be in her presence through the means 
of a stalking injunction. Moreover, the respondent has not shown 
that the petitioner's claim was frivolous or that it was of little weight 
or importance having no basis in law or fact. To the contrary, the 
court finds that the petitioner's claim that the respondent was 
stalking her had a supportable basis in fact even though the 
petitioner did not prevail (Ruling on Verified Application for Atty's 
Fees and Costs at 2.) 
A trial court's findings of fact are entitled to great deference. It would be 
manifestly unjust to require a victim of sexual assault and subsequent stalking to 
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APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MISINTERPRETING THE 
"EMOTIONAL DISTRESS" REQUIREMENT OF UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 76-5-106.5; PETITIONER IS REQUESTING THE COURT 
TO CORRECT THE ERROR, NOT TO "LEGISLATE," AS 
RESPONDENT ALLEGES. 
In his brief, the Respondent alleges that the Petitioner is asking the Court to 
"legislate" by clarifying the definition of "emotional distress" for purposes of 
satisfying Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-106.5. That is, Respondent suggests that if this 
Court rules on this issue it would constitute judicial activism. 
Petitioner is not urging the Court to legislate, but rather is seeking to show 
that the trial court erred in applying the definition of "emotional distress" set forth 
in the criminal case of Salt Lake City v. Lopez, 953 P.2d 1259, 1264 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1997) to a civil stalking case, and to urge the Court to correct the error. 
Petitioner maintains that the trial court erred in using the Lopez definition 
of "emotional distress," i.e., only conduct that is 'outrageous and intolerable' in 
that it offends the generally accepted standards of decency and morality is 
sufficient to satisfy the "emotional distress" requirement of §§ 76-5-106.5, 77-3a-
101(1). The burden of proof is different in civil cases. It is submitted that in 
applying the Lopez definition of "emotional distress," the trial court used a 
"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of proof rather than the correct standard, a 
preponderance of the evidence. 
Respondent alleges that the Petitioner failed to preserve her right to appeal 
the standard of proof issue by not objecting to the "Order Dissolving Ex Parte 
Civil Stalking Injunction." It is true that the Petitioner did not object to the Order 
pursuant to Rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. This was because 
the trial court had entered its final order dismissing the action, and Petitioner did 
not wish to waste her time filing an objection to a final, dispositive judgment with 
the trial court. Instead, she filed a timely Notice of Appeal on February 25, 2005 
appealing the final judgment of the trial court. Petitioner believes that the Notice 
of Appeal adequately preserved the issue for appeal. 
Even if this Court does determine that the Lopez definition of "emotional 
distress" can properly be applied in a civil case, the Petitioner is still not asking 
this Court to "legislate." The trial court erred in ruling that the only means by 
which the Petitioner could prove "emotional distress" was by showing that the 
Respondent's conduct was "'outrageous and intolerable' in that it offends the 
generally accepted standards of decency and morality." Id. This was not the 
holding in Lopez. The trial court's decision ignores the plain text of § 76-5-106.5, 
which states that the conduct must be such that a "reasonable person" under the 
circumstances would experience emotional distress. This Court clearly applied a 
"reasonable person" standard in Lopez when it stated that, "Defendant had 
numerous contacts with G.M.M. that reasonably would cause her emotional 
distress. Defendant was not prosecuted merely for being in G.M.M.'s presence; he 
was prosecuted for causing emotional distress to G.M.M. and engaging in 
behavior directed at her that could reasonably be understood as threatening." Id at 
1264-65. The Petitioner is asking this Court to properly apply the entire Lopez 
definition of emotional distress, which includes the objective "reasonable person" 
under the circumstances test, not just the "outrageous and intolerable" portion 
exclusively relied on by the trial court. 
Petitioner further maintains that if the Court applies the Lopez definition of 
emotional distress to this case, it should distinguish it from the "outrageous and 
intolerable" standard cited in Lopez, which is derived from tort law. Petitioner has 
previously cited extensive case law showing that Utah is the only state that has not 
yet distanced itself from the tort-based definition of "emotional distress." 
The Petitioner is asking this court to do precisely what the Tenth Circuit did 
in Veile v. Martinson, 258 F.3d 1180, 1189 (10th Cir. 2001). The Tenth Circuit 
clarified that to satisfy the "emotional distress" requirement of the Wyoming State 
Stalking Statute did not require any reference to tort law: " . . . We believe the 
absence of a discussion about the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress 
in the opinion [Luplow v. State] (save for its presence in some of the cases cited in 
the opinion) means the tort's requirements and elements have no bearing on the 
separate, statutorily-defined civil action for stalking." In one sentence, the Tenth 
Circuit clarified any confusion that the Wyoming stalking statute's definition of 
emotional distress should be defined by any reference to tort law. The Tenth 
Circuit, rather than "legislating," was clarifying the existing definition. In his 
brief, Respondent states, "Respondent urges this Court to employ judicial restraint 
and simply review this case based on plain and ordinary language that the Utah 
Legislature choose (sic) to utilize" (Appellee's Brief at 15.) This is what the 
Petitioner is urging by requesting the-Court to analyze this case under the 
objective "reasonable person" language of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-106.5 and to 
downplay the "separate, statutorily-defined" stalking statute's reference to the tort 
of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Veile v. Martinson, 258 F.3d 1180, 
1189 (10th Cir. 2001). 
II. EXAMINATION OF A "COURSE OF CONDUCT" BY 
DEFINITION REQUIRES ACCUMULATIVE ANALYSIS, AND 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ANALZYING THE ALLEGED 
INCIDENTS OF STALKING SEPARATELY. 
The Respondent alleges that the "plain and ordinary" language of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-106.5 requires a reader to examine each alleged incident of 
stalking separately and determine whether there are at least two incidents that rise 
to the level of being "outrageous and intolerable in that [they] offend the generally 
accepted standards of decency and morality." Salt Lake City v. Lopez, 935 P.2d 
1259, 1264 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). It is counter-intuitive to analyze incidents 
constituting a "course of conduct/' separately, particularly in a stalking context. 
The Alaska Court of Appeals explained the reasoning behind examining the 
cumulative effect of individual acts of stalking: 
In contrast the actus reus of the crime of stalking is defined as a 
series of acts. The stalking statute requires the State to prove that the 
defendant engaged in a "course of conduct" comprising "repeated 
acts of nonconsensual contact." It is the defendant's course of 
conduct, not the defendant's individual acts that must engender the 
requisite fear in the victim. Moreover, in a stalking prosecution, the 
individual acts committed by the defendant are not necessarily 
criminal in themselves; rather, they become criminal because they 
are committed in series. Cook v. Alaska, 36 P.2d 710, 721 (Ala. Ct. 
App. 2001). 
Further, The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has stated, "It is 
the continuing course of conduct which constitutes the offense, not the individual 
discrete actions making up the course of conduct." Washington v. United States, 
760 A.2d 187, 198-99 (D.C. App. 2000). 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that factors to be considered in 
analyzing a "course of conduct" in the context of a criminal statute, Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-415. l(3)(g), is that if "all of these acts were essentially 
interchangeable, occurred over a defined period of time and in the same 
uninterrupted course of conduct..." Utah v. Reed, 8 P.3d 1025, 1031 (Utah 
2000). 
In this case, the incidents occurred over the period of a few months, many 
of them on successive days. They were largely interchangeable and, if considered 
separately, no one incident might rise to the level of being criminal, (although this 
is not true of the incidents that also constituted a violation of the Ex Parte Stalking 
Injunction). If the trial court had examined the incidents cumulatively, it would 
have found that the incidents together demonstrate a clear pattern of maintaining 
"physical and visual" proximity to the Petitioner and clearly show the 
Respondent's intent to cause her fear and emotional distress. Therefore, the trial 
court erred in failing to analyze the incidents collectively as a course of conduct, 
as required by the statute. 
III. PETITIONER PROPERLY PRESERVED THE ISSUE OF 
WHETHER VIOLATION OF AN EX PARTE STALKING 
INJUNCTION IS GROUNDS FOR IMMEDIATE ENTRY OF A 
PERMANENT STALKING INJUNCTION PURSUANT TO UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 76-5-106.5(3). 
The Respondent alleges in his Appellee's brief that the Petitioner failed to 
preserve the issue of whether violation of the Ex Parte Stalking Injunction was 
grounds for immediate entry of a permanent stalking injunction (Appellee's Brief 
at 19-20). The analysis is incorrect. 
Respondent cites Tolman v. Winchester Hills Water Co., 912 P.2d 457, 461 
(Utah Ct. App. 1996) to say that in order to preserve an issue for appeal, a party 
must provide "supporting evidence or relevant legal authority" to support its 
argument. Petitioner agrees, and she did so in the trial court. The Respondent 
alleges that the only argument Petitioner gave in support of her position was to 
attempt to compare a violation of an Ex Parte Stalking Injunction with a violation 
of an Ex Parte Protective Order. The Respondent's brief cites large portions of the 
Petitioner's admittedly imperfect articulation of that argument to support the 
proposition that Petitioner failed to cite any relevant legal authority. The fact is 
that the Petitioner also clearly cited and discussed Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-106.5 
(3) as legal authority, which states, "A person is also guilty of stalking who 
intentionally or knowingly violates a stalking injunction issued pursuant to Title 
77, Chapter 3a, Stalking Injunctions, or intentionally or knowingly violates a 
permanent criminal stalking injunction issued pursuant to this section." Petitioner 
cited this statute in the record at pages 293-94 and again at page 296. This 
discussion is more than adequate to preserve this issue for appeal. 
The Respondent goes on to state that "the Petitioner adds language that 
does not appear in either statute." Petitioner is clearly citing to § 76-5-106.5(3), 
which states in clear, unambiguous language that "a person is also guilty of 
stalking who intentionally or knowingly violates a stalking injunction . . . " 
Petitioner merely makes the natural inference that an Ex Parte Stalking Injunction 
is a bona fide stalking injunction falling within the purviews of this statutory 
provision. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the trial court's summary judgment dismissing 
the Petitioner's case and enter a permanent stalking injunction against the 
Respondent because she proved a prima facie case of stalking in the trial court. 
The Petitioner further requests that a permanent stalking injunction be entered on 
the independent basis that the Respondent violated the Ex Parte Stalking 
Injunction. 
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